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Shapley Value and Monopoly Power In A Two-Sector Model
Abstract
This paper considers the measurement of monopoly power in light of recent advances in game theory, in
particular those relating to the Shapley value [2, 3, 6]. Traditional measures of monopoly power (e.g., 17])
were all based on Cournot's model of monopoly [5], where the monopolist, knowing his demand curve and
knowing that it is Independent of his action, maximizes his profits. Indeed, without the passivity of buyers, the
hypothesis of profit maximization cannot operate, for then the situation is that of a game. The essential
problem with this model, as pointed out by Aumann [1], is answering when buyers in a monopolized market
become passive. Surely it takes more than one buyer, but will even a continuum of buyers be enough? Some
examples in the literature [4, 9] suggest that with a very large number of buyers, monopoly will indeed be
advantageous, in so far as a monopoly's imputation equals its Shapley value. Testing this hypothesis is the aim
of the paper.
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This paper considers the measurement of monopoly power in light of
recent advances in game theory, in particular those relating to the Shapley
value [2, 3, 6]. Traditional measures of monopoly power (e.g., 17]) were
all based on Cournot's model of monopoly [5], where the monopolist, knowing
his demand curve and knowing that it is Independent of his action, maximizes
his profits. Indeed, without the passivity of buyers, the hypothesis of
profit maximization cannot operate, for then the situation is that of a
game. The essential problem with this model, as pointed out by Aumann [1],
is answering when buyers in a monopolized market become passive. Surely
it takes more than one buyer, but will even a continuum of buyers be enough?
Some examples in the literature [4, 9] suggest that with a very large
number of buyers, monopoly will indeed be advantageous, in so far as a
monopoly's imputation equals its Shapley value. Testing this hypothesis
is the aim of the paper.
The organization and results of the paper are as follows. The next
section sets out the model and its interpretation. Basically, one has a two
sector, two-class model of the sort common to growth theory, with the feature
that either or both classes may form monopolies. The major concept of the
paper, the Shapley value, is discussed in section 3. In section 4 is proved
the major result of the paper: monopoly on the part of labor is always
advantageous, and monopoly on the part of capitalists is advantageous if
the competitive wage bill is increasing. An example shows the necessity
of the latter proviso. The Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function is
interpreted in the light of the result in section 5. Some possible exten
sions and unanswered questions conclude the paper.
2. The Model
The economy is portrayed as a two-sector model, whose features consist
of the following:
(1) A measure space of agents (N,S , L), where N = [0, 2].
S is the class of admissible coalitions S; and L is Lebesgue
measure. Every admissible S is a Lebesgue measurable subset of [0, 2].
(2) Two economic goods, x and y. x can be thoughtof as the input to
a production process whose output is y.
(3) Two classes of agents, characterized by their production functions,
f(x(s)), and initial endowments of the input x(8).
For 0 s s i 1, x(s) = X > 0.
f(x(s)) = 0.
For 1 < s ^ 2, x(s) = 0.
f(x(s)) « f(x),
a strictly concave, increasing function, with f(0) =0. £ has at least
two derivatives.
(4) The produced good y is a medium for the exchange of utility. The
utility of every agent in the economy Is linear in y; side-payments in
utility are unrestricted.
(5) A monopoly exists in either of two events:
[0, 1] e 5, and for every Sc [0, 1/2], S ^S
or [1, 2] e S, and for every S c [1/2, 1], S J S,
Technically speaking, a monopoly exists when either of the two classes
forms an atom. A bilateral monopoly exists when both of the classes
form atoms. Competition is perfect when no atom is present. In this
case, every measurable coalition is admissible.
If one thinks of agents of the first type as laborers, agents of the
second type as capitalists, then the former situation corresponds to a
labor monopoly in the factor market, the latter, to a monopsony of capital
ists in the factor market. Naturally, the-se interpretations are switched
if one thinks of the product market as operating. However, instead of
thinking in terms of the operation of markets, we shall regard the situa
tion, whatever the state of competition, as a cooperative game.
3. The Shapley Value for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility
In a cooperative game based on the present model, the worth of a
coalition S, v(S) is given by:
(6) v(S) « max £(x(s))d8




In light of (3), the maxiaum is well defined. It is easy to see that
v(S) = 0 when S = [0, I], [1, 2] or L(S) = 0; and that v(N) = £(x).
The Shapley value cp of a game v, cpv, is a linear operator which
measures the formal power of an agent or group of agents, given the state
of competition. Crucial for the purposes of the paper is that the value
obeys Pareto optimality, i.e., (jjv(N) = v(N). Thus, using the value to
measure power assumes that allocative efficiency is achieved and focuses
on the distributional aspects of the state of competition.
The value takes on different but related forms for each of the
form states of competition considered in this paper.
(a) Bilateral monopoly, the only admissible coalitions besides N
and it complement being [0, 1] and [1, 2]. This is then a game with a
finite number of players, the type considered initially by Shapley [8].
The value of the capitalist class [1, 2] in this game is given by:
(7) cpv([l, 2]) - l/2(v(N) - v([l, 2]))+ 1/2 v([l, 2]) = 1/2 v(N).
By Pareto efficiency, the value of the laboring class must also be
1/2 v(N). Thus, in bilateral monopoly, power is shared equally.
(b) Perfect competition, where all measureable coalitions are
allowed. To define the value^ introduce a vector measure p,, where:
u,j^(s) = L(s n [0, 1])
H^CS) = L(S n [1, 2]).
Thus, measures how much of the laboring class belongs to coalition S
In view of (6), v(S) is given by:
(8) v(S) = ii2(S) f(; (J,^(S)/H2(S)), as long as ^2(8) > 0.
The value of a coalition S is given by:
^v(9) cpv(S) =,n.(S) ^ (f, t) dt + n, (S)1 Jq ^1 Jq ^2
raorever, as [3] shows, (p^(S) is equivalent to the competitive equilibrium
imputation.
The values for both these states of competition have been axiomatized
[e.g., 3].
(c) Capital monopsony, where [1, 2] is the only atom. One way to
think of this case is that, starting from bilateral monopoly, the labor side
of the market is broken up into smaller and smaller prices. The limit of
any such process, if it exists, is unique and is the asymptotic value (in
contrast to the axiomatic value, which Hart [6] has shown to be highly
non-unique in this case).
The asymptotic value of [1, 2] is given by





with the rest of.v(N) distributed uniformly among laborers.
(d) Labor monopoly, where [0, 1] is the only atom. This case is
analogous to that in (c), with the value of the labor atom,
pi
(11) cpv([0, 1]) « v(l, t)dt;
• •'o
the rest of v(N) being distributed uniformly among the capitalists.
4. Shapley value with Monopoly
This section establishes relationships among the formulas for the
Shapley value (9), (10), and (11) corresponding to perfect competition
and the two kinds of monopoly.
Theorem. Let the production function be a strictly concave, increasing
function, with f(0) = 0. Then (a) the power of the capitalist class as
an atom is greater than its non-atomic power, when the laboring class is
competitive and when the competitive wage bill of the laboring class is
increasing, (b) The power of the laboring class as an atom is always
greater than its non-atomic power given a competitive capitalist class.
Proof. To prove (a) it suffices to show that (10) > (9). From (8),
v(t, I) = f(xt) 1 s t i 0. Differentiating (8) with respect to y,2,
and evaluating along (t, t) yields:
(t, t) = f(x) - xf*(x), a constant.
^2
Thus> it suffices to show
a
(12)
Integrating by parts, the left-hand side becomes:
f(x) -




Since by hypothesis, xf'(x), the competitive wage bill is increasing
and limit (xt) f'(xt) = xf'(x), t -♦ 1, one sees that (12) holds.
To prove (b) it suffices to show that (11) > (9). From (8), v(l, t) =
tf(x/t). Differentiating (8) with respect to and evaluating along (f, t)
yields:
(f, t) = xf*(x), a constant.
Thus, it suffices to show:
(13) t f(x/t)dt > xf'(x).
Integrating by parts and rearranging:
- - rl -
f(x) - xf*(x) > xf*(x) - xf'(x/t)dt.
''o
The left-hand side is greater than zero, by strict concavity of f; the
right-hand side is less than zero, again by strict concavity of f. This
establishes (13).
Remark. The following example shows that (a) fails if the competitive wage
bill is decreasing. Let f(x) - 1 - e a function satisfying the require
ments of the theorem. For x > 1, the competitive wage bill xf'(x) is decreasing,
Computing (12), one has x ^(1-e ^)>i-e ^(1 + x), which fails for
X large.
5. A Parametric Example
Certain insights into the above theorem can be gathered by considering
the case where:
f (x) = x"^, Q< ot< I.
From (8),
v(S) =
The characteristic function belongs to the Cobb-Douglas family.
Computing partial derivatives and evaluating along the main diagonal:
^ (f , t) =x" a, ^ (f, t) =j"' (1 - Q,)
^1 ^2
In particular, <pv([l, 2]), applying (9) equals
1 x®' (1 - a?)dt = x" (1 - a);
which verifies that under perfect competition the capitalist's share of
income, 1 - a, is precisely their share of power.
Now consider what happens when capitalists form an atom. Since:
v(t, 1) - x®' in light of (10).
,1
tpv([l, 2]) = i" t" dt
0
Since , > x°^(l ~ (x) on 0 < < 1, monopoly is advantageous for the
0? + 1
capitalists. Likewise, if the laborers form an atom, since v(l, t) =






^ >axonO<cv<l, monopoly is advantageous for laborers as
well.
Table 1, whose entries are the power shares of labor, collects these
results.












The table sheds a certain amount of light on the nation of class
struggle, especially when the object of struggle is relative power. For
Instance, the Injunction to laborers to unite becomes understandable,
since their power share as an atom is always greater, regardless of the
8nature of the capitalist class, than their non-atomic power share.
Symmetrically, the same motivation supports a tendency toward accumlation
of capitals on the part of capitalists. Thus, a state of perfect compe
tition is unlikely to endure in a setting of organized class struggle.
One should also mention here an implication of this simple example
for adherence to the doctrine of the aggregate production function. Thus,
suppose one attempts to estimate the technological parameter o of a Cobb-
Douglas production function
fCK, L) = L®
from data on income shares. Let these data be generated by Table 1.
Then, except in the case of perfect competition, what one observes is not
a technological relation at all, but a power relation. Thus, one could
be lead by data suggesting constant relative income shares, to acceptance
of an aggregate production function (with its dubious capital argument--
when in fact no such capital exist), whereas what one is actually observing
is a stationary period in an ongoing class struggle for power.
6. Extensions and Open Questions
One desirable extension of the model would be the introduction of
produced means of production. These, if put in the hands of the capi
talists, might lead to a more symmetric advantage to monopoly than achieved
so far. The results ought to hold for differentiated labor, although then
the intrepretation of the laboring class becomes rather more subtle.
Increasing returns, unless they eventually stop, are beyond the scope of
the model, for v(S) goes unbounded.
An open question is the specification of formulas analogous to (10)
and (11) when an atom consists of less than an entire class, or when
there are several atoms in each class. One expects that results In such
cases lie "between" those of perfect ccmipetitlon and monopoly.
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